Greenwald Provides Historical and Psychological Context for Nuclear Negotiations with Iran

Before assessing the status of the Iran nuclear negotiations, Jon Greenwald, International Crisis Group vice president and SPP visiting professor, reviewed some of the history and psychology that he said were "essential" to understanding the issue because "the past is a heavy burden on both sides."

Greenwald explained that the U.S. had been well regarded in Iran until the 1953 coup that it organized and helped carry out to oust democratically-elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq. Washington's support for an increasing brutal and autocratic Shah in the 1970s only worsened its reputation in the country. Iran is not well regarded in the U.S. either, primarily — but not only — because of the lingering effect of the 1979 hostage crisis, a "traumatic event" that has not been forgotten.

Greenwald reminded his audience that the U.S. and Western Europe had in effect supported Iraq throughout its eight-year war with Iran, though Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi dictator, had started the conflict and made extensive use of a weapon of mass destruction (poison gas) during it.

The closest the two sides have ever come to real cooperation, said Greenwald, was in the months after 9/11 when Iran provided "significant help" to the U.S. in defeating the Taliban and establishing a new government in Afghanistan. That cooperation broke down in 2002 after President George W. Bush labeled Iran, Iraq, and North Korea the "Axis of Evil." Shortly thereafter Iran's covert nuclear program was revealed. Nothing about it was necessarily inconsistent with a peaceful nuclear program, but "people were understandably shocked by how sophisticated it was and, especially, that it had been carried out in secret."

Turning his attention to more recent events, Greenwald described the conflicting strategies the U.S. and Iran pursued before the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (the P5+1) and the Islamic Republic reached their important provisional nuclear agreement in November 2013. Washington built up increasingly heavy economic sanctions, first unilaterally then multilaterally, with a view to forcing Iran back to the negotiating table in a conciliatory mood. Tehran created ever more "facts on the ground," with a view to compelling acceptance of its nuclear program.

Emphasizing that he was expressing his personal views throughout the evening, Greenwald said that many observers had been surprised by the decision to extend the agreement that otherwise would have expired last week. He welcomed the seven-month extension, which, he said, reflected that the negotiations had made important progress, but cautioned that the complexity of the unresolved issues and the tightening political environment in the U.S. made it still very much an open question whether a comprehensive settlement can be achieved.

It is not just Republicans who are skeptical about such an agreement with Iran, Greenwald noted, but also some important Democrats. President Obama will likely have to use his shrinking political capital more to fend off efforts to impose new sanctions—something that would be a "deal breaker" for Iran—than to create additional flexibility for his negotiators. Likewise, he said, there are hardliners in Iran who are skeptical about the benefits of a nuclear deal.

Despite these obstacles, there are some grounds for optimism and also compelling reasons in an increasingly dangerous Middle East for both sides to reach a comprehensive agreement, Greenwald concluded. He urged those curious about the compromises that might make this possible to look at the 40-step plan the International Crisis Group published in August.